As part of its "Featured Articles" section, DiasporaEcho presents a translated overview of a study by former U.S. diplomat Jeffrey Feltman, published by the Brookings Institution under the title "Lebanon Between War and Statehood: Shrinking the Space for Hezbollah."

The study reflects the views of its author and does not necessarily represent the editorial position of DiasporaEcho. It is, however, particularly significant as it comes from one of the foremost American officials who followed the Lebanese file for many years and offers an insight into how the United States may approach Lebanon in the coming period.

Introduction

As Iran insists that Lebanon be included in ceasefire negotiations with the United States and Israel, Israel's seizure of Beaufort Castle on May 31 revived memories of the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon between 1982 and 2000, a period that contributed significantly to Hezbollah's rise and consolidation.

Feltman argues that while Israel continues its military operations in Lebanon, Washington and Tehran wait for each other to make concessions, and Lebanon breaks a long-standing political taboo by engaging in direct talks with Israel, one fundamental reality remains: there is no quick or short-term solution to Hezbollah's weapons.

According to the author, although the United States, Israel, and the Lebanese leadership all seek to reduce Hezbollah's military capabilities, developments on the ground suggest that Israel's expanding military campaign has failed to eliminate the group. Instead, Hezbollah has adapted by increasingly relying on asymmetric warfare and unconventional tactics.

At the same time, Feltman contends that the Lebanese Armed Forces are currently incapable of disarming Hezbollah by force due to the weakness of the Lebanese state and its institutions, as well as their inability to replace the jobs, social services, and support networks that Hezbollah provides to a large segment of Lebanon's historically marginalized Shiite community.

He also argues that Iran is unlikely to abandon Hezbollah during any negotiations with Washington and may instead seek to strengthen its support for what remains one of its most important regional allies.

What Does Feltman Propose?

Feltman argues that reducing Hezbollah's military and political influence requires a long-term strategy built on several key pillars.

First, patience and long-term planning, as the issue cannot be resolved through rapid solutions or military action alone.

Second, sustained American leadership in supporting Lebanese state institutions and overseeing the implementation of any agreements that may emerge from U.S.-Iranian or Lebanese-Israeli negotiations.

Third, launching practical programs aimed at convincing Lebanon's Shiite community that relinquishing Hezbollah's weapons would not leave them vulnerable to Israeli or regional threats, and that the Lebanese state is capable of gradually restoring security, providing public services, and revitalizing the economy.

He further argues that any future effort by the Lebanese Armed Forces to establish the state's monopoly over weapons must be accompanied by a credible and effective civilian government presence so that actions against Hezbollah are not perceived as actions against Lebanon's Shiite community.

Feltman also stresses that Washington should factor Lebanon into its negotiations with Tehran, warning that any sanctions relief or access to frozen Iranian assets could enable Iran to channel new funding to Hezbollah, allowing it to finance relief and reconstruction efforts while rebuilding part of its political influence.

Conversely, he notes that the extensive destruction in Shiite areas, coupled with growing criticism within the Shiite community itself over Hezbollah's decision to drag Lebanon into war, creates an opportunity for the Lebanese state to regain ground if it manages to seize the moment.

Syrian Dominance and Hezbollah's Rise

Feltman explains that Hezbollah was virtually the only Lebanese militia that was not required to disarm under the 1990 Taif Agreement, which ended Lebanon's fifteen-year civil war. He attributes this exception to Israel's continued occupation of southern Lebanon, as Hezbollah's weapons were considered part of the "resistance" against Israeli occupation.

He adds that Hezbollah maintains with some justification, in his view that its armed resistance forced Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon in 2000, ending an eighteen-year occupation. By contrast, the Israeli-backed South Lebanon Army, which refused to comply with the Taif Agreement's disarmament provisions, collapsed once the occupation ended.

According to Feltman, Hezbollah also successfully presented itself as the defender of Lebanon's Shiite community, which he says had long suffered from political and economic marginalization at the hands of Sunni and Christian elites.

While fundamentally serving Iran's regional agenda, Hezbollah, he argues, gave many Lebanese Shiites a sense of dignity and purpose by providing social services, employment opportunities, and increased political influence.

He further contends that had Hezbollah evolved into a purely political movement, it would today represent Lebanon's largest and most disciplined political force. Its continued insistence on maintaining its military wing, however, reflects Iran's determination to preserve it as a strategic regional asset.

From Syrian Tutelage to Hezbollah's Growing Influence

Feltman notes that during the years immediately following Lebanon's civil war, the United States did little to challenge Syria's presence in Lebanon. It was only in 2004 that Washington shifted its policy, viewing support for Lebanese sovereignty as a means of limiting Syrian and Iranian influence in the region.

According to the study, the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005 and Syria's subsequent withdrawal did not weaken Hezbollah. On the contrary, the group emerged stronger, fought Israel during the 2006 war, significantly expanded its military arsenal, and increasingly used its political leverage to pressure successive Lebanese governments and shape national decision-making.

The Lebanese Army: Progress and Limitations

The author notes that the United States has invested heavily in strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces through training, equipment, and financial support, particularly salaries, helping the army improve its capabilities, especially in combating ISIS.

Nevertheless, Feltman argues that the army continues to face major constraints, including limited financial resources, fears of sectarian divisions within its ranks, and Washington's reluctance largely in response to Israeli concerns to supply advanced weaponry capable of balancing Hezbollah's military superiority.

Meanwhile, Hezbollah fighters acquired extensive battlefield experience alongside Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps during the Syrian civil war, significantly enhancing their military capabilities.

Policy Recommendations

Feltman believes that the regional developments following October 7 have created a unique opportunity to reduce Hezbollah's influence, but insists that military means alone will not achieve this objective.

He argues that decades of attempts to weaken Hezbollah have yielded disappointing results and that the current moment requires a comprehensive long-term strategy centered on rebuilding the Lebanese state and restoring public confidence in its institutions.

1. Strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces

The author believes that the Lebanese Armed Forces will eventually have to deal with Hezbollah's military wing and therefore calls for continued efforts to enhance the army's capabilities.

He proposes that the United States, in coordination with Lebanon and Israel, develop security arrangements enabling the Lebanese army to gradually deploy in areas vacated by Israeli forces while establishing clear mechanisms for monitoring and implementation, drawing on United Nations expertise in disarmament, reintegration, and security-sector reform.

He also argues that previous initiatives suffered from weak enforcement mechanisms, a deficiency that must be addressed in any future agreement.

2. Consolidating a Ceasefire

Feltman calls on Washington to pursue two parallel diplomatic tracks:

Lebanon-Israel negotiations.

U.S.-Iran negotiations.

He argues that a lasting ceasefire requires active American leadership, as the United States remains, in his assessment, the only actor capable of bringing together the relevant parties while mobilizing the political and financial support needed to implement any agreement.

He also warns that renewed escalation could undermine prospects for stability, particularly given domestic political considerations within Israel.

3. Reconstruction and Restoring Confidence in the State

According to Feltman, reconstruction represents a critical test for the Lebanese state.

Following the 2006 war, Hezbollah earned significant public support because it moved more quickly than the government in compensating victims and financing reconstruction.

Today, however, the scale of destruction is far greater while Hezbollah's financial resources are more limited, creating an opportunity for the Lebanese state to take the lead in relief and reconstruction efforts, provided it receives sufficient international assistance.

He recommends that the United States work with the United Nations, France, and donor countries to establish oversight mechanisms that ensure aid reaches its intended beneficiaries while preventing misuse through institutions considered vulnerable to corruption.

He argues that successful reconstruction led by the state would strengthen public confidence in government institutions and reduce dependence on Hezbollah's parallel structures.

4. Limiting Iranian Influence

Feltman believes Iran is unlikely to abandon Hezbollah during any political negotiations.

He argues that if Tehran gains sanctions relief or access to frozen assets, it will likely direct part of those resources to Hezbollah, enabling the group to restore its political and social influence.

He therefore urges Washington to account for this possibility during negotiations with Iran and to prevent newly available financial resources from reinforcing Hezbollah's capabilities.

Conclusion

Feltman concludes that the political and military environment that has emerged following October 7 and the subsequent Iran war differs fundamentally from previous periods, creating what he sees as an unprecedented opportunity to rebuild the Lebanese state and reduce Hezbollah's influence.

He argues that success will require sustained international support enabling the Lebanese state to reassert its authority, monopolize the use of force, provide security and public services, and revive the economy, ultimately restoring Lebanon as a stable state that poses no threat to its neighbors.

Nevertheless, he questions whether this vision can realistically be achieved, arguing that it requires more time than Israel may be willing to allow and a level of sustained American commitment that appears increasingly difficult to maintain amid the retrenchment of U.S. diplomatic engagement.

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